

**Tanzania in Transition –  
Violent Conflicts as a result of political and economic reform  
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Tanzania is known to be an “oasis of peace” (Hofmeier 1997) on the troubled African continent. Although Tanzania is among the few African states that have experienced a “classical” war – a war between two independent states (Matthies 1998) – the East African country can look back on forty years of relative internal peace and stability. No civil wars, no military coups, no state-collapse, no warlords, neither ethnic nor religious, neither political nor social clashes have tormented the country and its people<sup>1</sup>. 40 years of peace and stability are unquestionably the greatest success of the country that is still one of the poorest countries in the world. But an increase in violent conflicts within the last few years seems to endanger this success. It appears that unavoidable reforms have helped the country out of its economic and political misery, but to the price of increasing violent conflicts.

Of course, Tanzania has never been a country without conflicts. As in any other society, conflicts between different interests, identities, opinions and demands occurred. They were fought out along the lines of ethnic and regional affiliation, religion and ideology, gender and generation, and many others. There were - inter alia - disputes about land, the Union between Zanzibar and the Mainland, or the political direction of the country. The villagization programme, one of the government’s most controversial policies, caused severe tensions and numerous deaths, and the witch-hunt for so-called “economic saboteurs” questioned the famous record of peace and political stability as was indicated by a failed coup attempt in 1982/ 3.

In this paper it will be argued, firstly that violent conflicts in Tanzania have increased in the last few years<sup>2</sup> and, secondly, that the increase of violent conflicts has to be seen in the context of changed modes of interaction between state and society and within the society. These changes were the – quite intended – results of the manifold reforms, which Tanzania

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<sup>1</sup> This characterisation does not apply to Zanzibar. The post-colonial history of the semi-autonomous islands is much more violent and conflict-ridden than that of Tanzania Mainland (Bakari 2001).

<sup>2</sup> It has to be pointed out that the seeming increase in violent conflicts can partly be attributed to an increased perception of conflicts. Reforms also included increased press-freedom. This means that incidences like violent clashes are now reported about. During the era of state-controlled media, it was much easier to suppress information about tensions and fighting. A recent example can be used to illustrate this argument. During clashes between two clans of the Wakurya in Tarime District in July 2001, journalists from various media travelled to Tarime to report about the occurrence. After arriving in Tarime, they were arrested by order of the Tarime District Commissioner. Although they were released later, their cameras remained in confiscation (MISA 2001).

undergoes since the mid-1980s<sup>3</sup>. Usually, the framework of these reforms is referred to as a double transition: from ujamaa-socialism to a free-market-system and from a one-party-system to a multi-party-system. If we differentiate more thoroughly, we can identify six areas of transition, which constitute separate processes of their own. Although these transitions are interconnected, they are not necessarily the result or the precondition to any other of these processes. The six transitions are: a political transition from a neo-patrimonialist one-party system to a competitive multiparty system; an economical transition from a state-dominated economy to a market economy; a societal transition from a society which was monolithically controlled through and integrated into the state party to a pluralistic open society; a constitutional transition from an extralegal polity which was characterized by party supremacy about the constitution to an intralegal polity which is characterized by the rule of law; an administrative-institutional transition from a centralized, bureaucratic-authoritarian and clientelist provisional state to a decentralised, rational and efficient civic service state; and a normative-cultural transition from the ujamaa ideology, which has been abandoned, to a new normative-cultural order which has not yet been identified, but which is desperately needed.

This paper focuses on tense conflicts between groups in society and between these groups and the state<sup>4</sup>, where violence has occurred as a means of conflict management<sup>5</sup>. The absence of a violent response to conflicts does - of course - not mean, that conflicts have not occurred. Rather it indicates the presence of other, peaceful, mechanisms of dealing with conflicts<sup>6</sup>. Also oppression as a response to conflict can prevent an outbreak of violence, and in many cases, oppression has been used to calm down arising conflicts in Tanzania. Although this strategy has been applied frequently, it was usually not accompanied by excessive use of state power. Rather police stopped the fighting, some of those involved were arrested, and promises to find a solution to the underlying causes of the conflicts were made – even if rarely

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<sup>3</sup> Of course, this is not the first time, that Tanzania undergoes severe changes of this kind. Also the phase of ujamaa, especially the villagization-programme, constituted a major and contentious change, which – almost inevitably - lead to a rise in conflict and violent responses.

<sup>4</sup> Objects of those conflicts are usually matters of public interest.

<sup>5</sup> We refer to a description of conflict which has been given by Johan Galtung in 1969. He identifies „three necessary components: firstly, incompatibility of interests (or a contradiction), [...]; secondly, negative attitudes in the form of perceptions or stereotypes about others; and thirdly, behaviours of coercion and gestures of hostility and threat.“ (Kotzé 2002: 1).

<sup>6</sup> These can be „bottom-up“ approaches which derive from the involved communities themselves and frequently refer to „traditional“ mechanisms to resolve conflicts (Zartman 2000, Cleaver 2001), as well as „top-down“ approaches which are applied by a state agency. An example for the second approach provided the clash of two clans of the Wakurya of Tarime District (Mara Region) in the 1980s, when a prominent member of the ruling party was sent there by her party to reconcile the two groups.

realised<sup>7</sup>. The fact that fighting has not resumed is rather owed to the prevailing attitude that violence can only be the very last solution to conflict, than to durable arrangements of peaceful conflict resolution.

A number of factors have contributed to the absence of internal violent clashes. Historical factors like the absence of strong centralised proto-states in the pre-colonial era (Mpangala 1999) and the changes in the colonial administrative systems (Mpangala 1999, Deutsch 1996) have formed a conducive environment for a distinct policy of nation building which was implemented after the country gained its independence (Hirschler 2002b). The inclusive politics of the former President Nyerere offered all groups in society a place within the political, social and economic framework of the postcolonial state<sup>8</sup>. Although chances were not equally distributed, exclusive politics, which could foster conflicts, were hardly employed by the Governments of that era. In addition, the well-organised one-party-state and the efficient intelligent service enabled the Government to get early notice of arising conflicts and to react accordingly. The state's response to arising conflicts took different forms, oppressive and conciliatory ones. Also the economic order of that time reduced the gap between the rich and the poor – which nevertheless existed. Social conflicts along socio-economic differences were unlikely to develop (Kaiser 1996).

Not the least important, the uniting policy of nation-building contributed to the creation of a consensus-oriented political culture that refuses violent measures to carry out conflicts (van Donge/ Liviga 1986, Okema 1996). This political culture has developed within the general population as well as among elites<sup>9</sup>. Although some scholars were worried that the introduction of a competing multi-party-system would bring up political entrepreneurs who would not hesitate to instrumentalize ethnic or religious sentiments to gain support, these cases were rare in Tanzania<sup>10</sup>. The main reason is a widespread conviction that

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<sup>7</sup> Examples for this way of handling conflicts are numerous. In 1989 conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Rundugai (Hai District) caused several deaths. The fighting was stopped by police, and several people were arrested. The Regional Commissioner promised to find a solution which allowed the pastoralists to graze their cattle without devastating the farmers' fields. According to officials from the village, no measures were taken. Consequently, clashes occurred again in 1999. In clashes between farmers and pastoralists in Kilosa District in December 2000, which caused the deaths of 31 people and made more than 400 people flee their homes, the authorities acted in the same way: the police came to stop the fighting, some people were arrested, some officials were transferred and promises were made to find a lasting solution to the conflict. But no further measures were taken (Mtwale 2002).

<sup>8</sup> Integration into the system however required the acceptance of the ruling party's supremacy. Opposition within that arrangement was possible – to a certain degree. But to challenge the Nyererean state and its arrangements as such was answered with exclusion and oppression (Peter 1997: 4ff, Mwijage 1994, Kambona 1968). The main instrument of integration was the incorporation of any – formerly independent – societal movement into the structures and under the control of the party structure.

<sup>9</sup> Hasenclever and Rittberger (1999) point out the importance of elites in mobilization for violent conflict.

<sup>10</sup> Kelsall (2000) however provides the example of the 1998 tax revolt in Arusha Region, where rivalry between two political leaders was among the factors that caused the revolt. His analysis revealed what had appeared to be

instrumentalizing such sentiments would endanger the only stability which people enjoy in Tanzania – a state of relative internal peace.

Next to policies which helped to reduce prejudices between the different ethnic groups<sup>11</sup>, education - if not indoctrination - in the idea of “Unity” was of central significance to this approach (Campbell 1999). With a Rousseauian concept of a unified society with an identifiable general will, Nyerere’s idea of unity saw the pursuance of differing ideas and interests as an attempt to destroy the whole for the sake of a few. Conflict was seen as something negative which would endanger the peaceful harmony in which the interactions between Tanzanians were perceived.

The violent developments in most of Tanzania’s neighbouring countries also fostered the perception that quarrel and disunity will lead to civil war. Until today Tanzanians have very negative attitudes towards conflict, which is seen only as a force of destruction, not as a potential “engine of progress” that can also lead to further development<sup>12</sup>.

And of course it needs to be mentioned that the negative attitude towards conflict and dissent was used to justify the ruling party’s exclusive claim to power (Cranenburgh 1990: 89ff, Mmuya 1998).

The severe economic crisis from the late 1970s onwards made reforms inevitable. In 1986 agreements with the IMF and the World Bank were achieved and the transformation of the state-controlled economy into a market economy was started (Rösch 1995, Biermann 1998 :175ff, Hofmeier 2002). In 1992, the monopoly of the ruling party CCM was given up. A multi-party system was introduced and the political space was opened up for further democratisation (Hyden 1999, Mmuya 2000, Erdmann 2002).

These two fundamental turns, which were accompanied by several other reforms, meant nothing less than a complete change in the modes of interaction between state and society and within the society: The principles of competition and private activity were introduced into Tanzania’s political and economic systems and replaced those of equality, unity and centralised control.

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a local popular uprising of dissatisfied citizens to be an intrigue of ambitious politicians who did not dare to instrumentalize even tribalist sentiments to mobilize the local population for their own interests.

<sup>11</sup> The government employed a deliberate policy of bringing different ethnic groups together in order to reduce prejudices. Some of the pupils of secondary schools were sent to boarding schools in different regions, where they lived and learned together with pupils from all over the country. The national service, where young people from different parts of Tanzania got semi-military as well as civilian education and worked in developmental projects, served the same purpose.

<sup>12</sup> A survey which was undertaken by the Sonderforschungsbereich 520 of Hamburg University in Mwanza, Ukerewe, Moshi and Hai District asked for the disadvantages of a multi-party democracy. The majority of respondents stated that conflict and disunity were the negative outcomes of such a competitive system. The results of the survey are not yet published.

The reforms were meant to improve Tanzania's economic and political situation, and indeed, liberalisation of the economy and the introduction of a market-based system contributed much to the improvement of living conditions. Goods became available – although expensive –, and new business opportunities developed. Those who were able to take advantage of the new system – and those who had the necessary contacts! – could improve their situation and achieve considerable wealth. But the majority of the population remained poor (Lugalla 1995). The gap between the rich and the poor increased and private accumulation of wealth became obvious. The relative equality within the population, which was one of the achievements Tanzanians used to be proud of, was perceived to be lost. Competition divided the society into winners and losers. Not that there had never been advantaged and disadvantaged before, but neither had the gap been so big nor had it been as visible and undisputed as it is now.

It is the “illegitimacy of the existing distributive mechanisms” (Mehler 2002: 38), the inequality of chances, combined with the visibility of wealth and the perception of illegal enrichment that causes tensions. A rapidly growing population of young migrants from the rural areas have shown to be a potential threat to peace in towns, especially in Dar es Salaam. Jobless and uneducated, they come to the towns to make their life there. But they find themselves deprived and without any chance. The public opinion which suspects networks of “the influential” to restrict access to the national wealth and to distribute chances only among their clientele, falls on fertile ground among those who feel themselves denied of their share of the national cake.

Here, a side-effect of another reform intensifies the tension: The privatisation of education<sup>13</sup>. Due to the limited financial resources of the government the improvement of the extremely poor educational sector has been put into private hands (Lwaitama/ Mtaló/ Mboma 2001, Mushi 2001). Especially the Christian churches became active and provided a good education. Although these schools are usually open for non-Christians too, the Muslim community mostly depends on the low standard governmental schools. Thus the already existing educational gap between Muslims and Christians is reinforced. This dissimilarity in education is translated into competitive disadvantages of Muslims in their efforts to find a good job –

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<sup>13</sup> Privatisation of education – as privatisation of the health system – has been one of the reforms which were introduced to improve service and to consolidate the state budget. The World Bank states: “Nevertheless, concerns are growing that the fiscal stability has been achieved largely at the expense of compressing public expenditure at a time when public services are deteriorating and key welfare indicators are declining” (World Bank 2002: 45).

especially in the governmental sector. And it results in a perception that the government favours Christians<sup>14</sup> (Ishumi 2001, Possi 2001, Yahya-Othman 2001).

After a court had persecuted a Muslim cleric for allegedly insulting Christianity in Summer 2001, thousands of Muslims demonstrated against the government. Numerous people were injured in the following clashes with the police, more than 170 were arrested. In the aftermath some bombs exploded in Dar es Salaam and for weeks the situation was so tense that a further escalation was feared (TOMRIC 2001).

Most, if not all observers agreed, that the outbreak of violence was less about an unjust court ruling against a fellow Muslim than the result of the high grade of frustration among a young generation which has no other perspectives than poverty and which feels excluded and betrayed. The causes of socio-economic deprivation were seen in cultural hegemony and resulted in the politicisation of cultural difference<sup>15</sup>. A conflict of interests (which can be negotiated!) was transformed into a conflict of identity where it is much more difficult to find a solution. Interestingly, a conflict-prone instrumentalisation of „primordial“ or „cultural“ characteristics remained mainly confined to religious creed. Although ethnicity and “race” have developed into categories of differentiation, exclusion and distrust (Heilman 1998, Peter 2001), systematic “politicisation of ethnicity” (Tetzlaff 2003) has not developed into a common feature<sup>16</sup>.

Economic reform introduced private ownership, competition and exclusion into a society which was characterised by ideals of state control, unity and inclusion. This did not only lead to those more general and later “culturalised” feelings of injustice and deprivation as in the example which was mentioned above. It also touched specific interests.

In the 1990s, when it became easier for foreign investors to enter the Tanzanian market, their main interest was in the most lucrative businesses – mining of gold and gemstone, fishing

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<sup>14</sup> Suspicion and conflicts between Christians and Muslims have a long tradition in Tanzania (Bakari/ Ndumbaro 2001). Although the relation between the two religions can generally be described as “harmonious”, tensions and even violence occurred from time to time (Ludwig 1995). Nevertheless, conflicts within the religious communities and conflicts between religious communities and the state have appeared even more frequently and more intense than conflicts between Muslims and Christians (Baroin 1996, Kilian 2001, Mmuya 2001, Nyirabu 2001, Tambila/ Rubanza 2001, Tambila/ Sivalon 2001).

<sup>15</sup> This argument follows what Hasenclever and Rittberger (1999) call the „constructivist“ approach. In short, this approach regards differences in religious creeds not the main cause for conflicts which occur along religious lines. Nevertheless, they admit that “religion matters” – in the sense that differences in religion can only be instrumentalised when the categories of religious creed are value-laden for the respective actors.

<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, especially in the years of the introduction of the multiparty-system, some politicians, like the infamous Reverend Mtikila, tried to gain some profit through the instrumentalisation of ethnic, racist and religious sentiments. In recent years the debate about indigenisation of the economy (uzawa) was fuelled mainly by Iddi Simba, the former minister of trade and commerce. In a revival of a debate which began in the early nineties, a greater share of the economy for “indigenous” Tanzanians is demanded – which is a clear aggression against foreign companies as well as against Tanzanians of Asian origin, who still control most of the country’s economy.

Nile Perch at Lake Victoria, sisal plantations in Tanga and Kilimanjaro Regions, supermarkets in Dar es Salaam etc. But in all these sectors indigenous business people and small artisans had already been active – less productive, less professional and usually informal. Most of the small-scale activities were not registered. Usually taxes were not paid and working conditions were poor. The Tanzanian government favoured the larger companies and granted them access to resources which up to then had informally but obviously been controlled by locals (Shivji 1998, Chachage 2001, Kamata 2002). Especially when the new competitors with their huge capital and their superior expertise, technologies and approaches were foreigners, the locals felt deprived of their supposed right to earn their living from what they got out of “their own” land (Kulaba 2002).

Mererani in Northern Tanzania is the only place in the world where a certain gemstone, called Tanzanite, is mined. The mining area is occupied by thousands of artisan miners and small companies. In the year 2000 the government gave about one quarter of the area to the South-African mining company Afgem. The largest quantities and the best quality of Tanzanite is assumed to be found in Afgem’s plot. Conflicts escalated, when Afgem insisted in its right to sole access to their area, while the small scale miners went on with their practice to ignore any border and invaded Afgem’s territory underground. A practise which is definitely illegal but widespread and well established, and which had never caused any major troubles. Since the problems started, the conflict left several people dead and injured. In their effort to increase professionalism in the mining sector and to regain control about it, the government ordered to temporarily close some of the small mines in July 2002, after almost 40 miners had died in an accident in the mines. The order was rejected by the miners, and reportedly 4.000 small-scale miners rioted the town in a bid to pressure the government to allow them to resume their mining activities (ippmedia (online) 16.7.2002).

Both examples have – at least – one thing in common. Reforms which were aimed to improve the economic and social situation changed the existing patterns of interaction and lead to an increase in conflicts. Through the reforms, chances were now made available but access was restricted. Private enterprise and competition were introduced into a society where control and unity had dominated the system. A constituent principle of competition is exclusion. If everybody is in the boat, there will be no competition. Since access to now available but scarce resources was thus restricted by exclusion, fighting for a good position became profitable and necessary, and the proneness to conflicts increased. Since conflict has never been perceived as a constructive force which is inherent in societal development but as an evil that has to be eliminated, strategies and mechanisms for a peaceful conflict management have

hardly been developed. Where “traditional” mechanisms failed, the state tended to react by suppressing the symptoms rather than tackling the underlying causes or installing durable systems of conflict management.

A similar process can be observed in the context of the democratisation process. Whereas one would have expected an increase of peace, more conflicts and violent clashes occurred than before the reforms. The opening up of the playing ground to many players has opened up chances for competitors - and on the other hand it has increased risks. An ambitious candidate, loosing elections in the one-party system could have hoped to be included anyway - by a presidential appointment to parliament or to another post.

In the Tanzanian multi-party system, where the winner takes it all, loosing an election means exclusion from the even more lucrative distributive system (Kelsall 2002). In addition, winning a seat and hence getting access to the networks became more attractive when the government permitted members of parliament to have their own private businesses. The former ban of having a private enterprise while holding a public office had been introduced by the Nyerere administration (McHenry 1994: 29ff). Although politicians always knew how to circumvent it, this regulation had at least avoided an openly visible enrichment of MPs. And it had contributed to reduce the need to fight intensively for an electoral victory. Consequently the inter- and the intra-party competition for good positions has become much more fierce and unfair since the multi-party system was introduced. Regional blocs and ethno-regional, clientelist networks have emerged as power and resource basis of ambitious politicians (Kelsall 2002). Corruption, vote-buying and rigging have become common features especially of internal party elections, while the inter-party relations are characterised by efforts to get the competitors down rather than by co-existence and co-operation (TEMCO). Also in Tanzania politics have become a business and politicians have turned into political entrepreneurs (Mmuya 1998, Kelsall 2002).

It seems to be the case that the idea of a constructive role of the opposition has not yet taken roots – neither within the ruling party nor within the opposition parties themselves. Political competition has become a race for individual or group interests, rather than a competition of ideas and policies. Consequently, the opposition’s efforts center on how to win the next general elections and the party in government is focussed on reducing the space for its competitors. Demonstrations of opposition parties are usually prohibited – because of “security concerns” – and when they take place nevertheless, they are dispersed violently and the party leaders are prosecuted.

The Tanzanian Labour Party (TLP) has frequently experienced this repression. Its party leader Augustine Mrema, once the most threatening challenger to President Mkapa, has been beaten, arrested, sentenced and released several times. The party's offices have been searched and devastated by security forces; TLP-demonstrations have been declared illegal and violent dispersal has led to numerous injured demonstrators.

The same response was taken by the government when the Zanzibar-based Civic United Front (CUF) became the strongest opposition party – after TLP had been successfully weakened. After the general elections of October 2000, CUF refused to accept the results in Zanzibar, which, in their opinion, had been rigged. CUF demanded a re-run of the elections, while the CCM government rejected this resolutely. The conflict escalated in January 2001, when CUF held demonstrations, which were suppressed with an unprecedented display of violence. Between 30 and 40 people were killed by security forces. It was the first time in Tanzania's history that a political conflict had demanded so many lives.

But after a short period of intensification of the conflict, a process of reconciliation between the two parties began which resulted in an agreement in October 2001. During the six months of negotiations, which were conducted by small teams in complete secrecy, a process of confidence-building between the leaders of the two parties developed. It enabled them to sign an accord which did not only agree upon a "cease-fire" but also worked out an elaborated plan to eliminate the causes of the conflict (Hirschler 2002a)<sup>17</sup>. Despite some minor problems, the agreement is now being implemented step by step. In May 2003, by-elections were held in Pemba, the island where the killings of 2001 took place (Burkey 2003). The elections were well-organised and conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. Both political parties accepted the results<sup>18</sup>.

This agreement shows two interesting aspects. Firstly, measures were agreed upon which removed some obstacles to a further deepening of the democratisation process in Zanzibar: the introduction of an independent Electoral Commission, a permanent voter's register and

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<sup>17</sup> Referring to Galtung's three components of conflict (interests, attitudes, behaviour) Kotzé suggests three elements of a successful conflict resolution: a cease-fire (behaviour), confidence-building (attitudes) and structural changes (interests). All three elements were tackled by the CCM-CUF negotiation team.

<sup>18</sup> This is even more noteworthy since both parties had some reasons to be discontented with the results. To CCM, the elections in the CUF-stronghold were a complete failure. The ruling party won not a single of the 15 seats for the union parliament. For the Zanzibar House of Representatives, CCM achieved six out of 16 seats. Since these seats had been held by CUF, the CCM-victory appears to be a success. But CCM only won the seats after the CUF-candidates for those six constituencies had been disqualified on formal reasons. The vast majority of voters in those six constituencies followed the advice of CUF and casted spoilt votes. CCM lost even their constituency of Mohamed Shein, which was vacant since Shein had been appointed Vice-President of the Union. CUF, who hold all the seats before its parliamentarians were dismissed, had reasons for protest, because of the disqualification of six of their contestants on formal reasons – which could have been applied to the other CUF-contestants, too (The East African (online edition), 22.5.2003).

others. Those measures have been demanded by opposition parties and civil-society groups for a long time. Secondly, the strictly exclusive politics, which were characterised by the principle of “the-winner-takes-it-all” were moderated and elements of an inclusive strategy were re-introduced. Members of the opposition have now to be appointed into the Zanzibar Electoral Commission as well as into the administration of the islands. President Mkapa immediately appointed a CUF member to the National parliament and the option of a CCM-CUF coalition government in Zanzibar was no longer ruled out (Hirschler 2002a).

When the multi-party system was introduced, political scientists in Tanzania discussed the advantages and disadvantages of such a political reform (Bakari 1995, Mmuya 1997). Those who were sceptical warned of an increase in violent conflicts, whereas the optimists referred to the instruments which democracy provides for conflict management. As it has been shown, conflicts have increased as well as violence as a response to the conflicts. The mechanisms that worked to that effect have been explained as follows:

Firstly, the introduction of economic and political competition changed the prevailing system of inclusion into one of exclusion. Secondly, as unequal access to profitable but scarce resources increased, fighting for a good position in the new political and economic order became more attractive. Thirdly, the new system of reduced control gave not only room for more economic and political freedom, but also to more violent ways to deal with competition. But the last example, that of the Zanzibar peace accord, showed that also the optimists were not arguing without reason. Democratisation bears risks, but it also provides opportunities to manage arising conflicts – if competition is not understood in terms of exclusion but as a principle that requires co-operation in order to work for the benefit of all participants.

Many Tanzanians are shocked by the recent increase of conflicts and violence in their country. And many see Tanzania on the road to civil war. But compared to the majority of countries in the South, Tanzania is still a very peaceful place. And surely, the foundations which have been laid in the era of Nyerere are still effective and will not be destroyed easily. Nevertheless, potentials for conflicts increased with the complete change of Tanzania’s economic and political orders. Conflicts are an integral part of societal interaction and the more dynamically societies change, the more conflicts between different interests, identities, opinions and demands are likely to occur.

In Tanzania, conflicts have always been perceived as a threat to peace, harmony and stability. The recent Zanzibar conflict has helped to experience a model of peaceful conflict management. In addition, it resulted in a push towards advancing the democratisation process – an achievement which would not have been attained without this confrontation.

Tanzania needs to accept conflicts as a normal aspect of human interaction. And Tanzanians will have to develop durable mechanisms of peaceful conflict management, which are not there at the moment (Heilmann 2001). Values that reject violent responses to conflicts can help a lot. But if peaceful mechanisms to manage arising conflicts are not developed and institutionalised, and if the underlying causes of conflicts are not tackled, an increase in conflicts and violent responses will be unavoidable – even in the oasis of peace and stability.

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