From: Yona Maro
Several well-known modus operandi (MO) are used by foreign governments attempting to acquire sensitive corporate or proprietary information (economic espionage). These include:
Unsolicited requests for proprietary information
Inappropriate conduct during visits
Suspicious work offers
Targeting at international exhibits, seminars, and conventions
Exploitation of joint ventures and joint research
Acquisitions of technology and companies
Co-opting of former employees
Targeting cultural commonalities
These activities serve as indicators of economic espionage. While these do not always mean there is an actual foreign collection threat, they can serve as a signal. Several indicators occurring in a given situation might warrant further examination.
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Unsolicited requests for proprietary information
Unsolicited requests for proprietary or classified information are associated with foreign collection activity. Requests frequently involve faxing, mailing, e-mailing, or phoning individuals rather than corporate marketing departments. The requests may involve surveys or questionnaires and are frequently sent over the Internet.
Marketing surveys can elicit sensitive technological and business information. With this particular method it is important to consider who is the end-user of the information and who is completing the survey. Increasing use of the Internet provides a method of direct communication with government and Canadian industry for foreign collection purposes. Internet access to a company’s bulletin board, home page, and employees provide a foreign collector many avenues to broaden collection efforts.
Indicators
The Internet address is in a foreign country.
The recipient has never met the sender.
Information on the technology requested is classified, export-controlled, or has both commercial and military applications.
The requester identifies his/her status as a student or consultant.
The requester identifies his/her employer as a foreign government or the work is being done for a foreign government or program.
The requester asks about a defence-related program, project, or contract.
The requester asks questions about defence-related programs using acronyms specific to the program.
The requester admits he or she could not get the information elsewhere because it was classified or controlled.
The requester advises the recipient to disregard the request if it causes a security problem or if it is for information the recipient cannot provide due to security classification, export controls, and so forth.
The requester advises the recipient not to worry about security concerns.
The requester assures the recipient that export licenses are not required or are not a problem.
Marketing surveys may be faxed or mailed to an individual via the company marketing office.
Marketing surveys may be sent by foreign consortiums or consulting companies. Foreign companies with foreign intelligence involvement are likely to be a consortium of officials, military officers, or private interests.
Marketing surveys often may exceed generally accepted terms of marketing information.
Strong suspicions that the “surveyor” is employed by a competing foreign company.
Surveys may solicit proprietary information concerning corporate affiliations, market projections, pricing policies, program or technology director’s names, company personnel working on the program, purchasing practices, and types and dollar amounts of Canadian government contracts.
Customer and supplier bases for a company may also be sent marketing surveys that exceed accepted terms of marketing information.
Inappropriate conduct during visits
Foreign visits to Canadian companies can present potential security risks if sound risk management is not practised and appropriate security measures implemented.
Indicators
Visitors are escorted by a diplomatic or embassy official who attempts to conceal their official identities during a supposedly commercial visit.
Hidden agendas, as opposed to the stated purpose of the visit; that is, visitors arrive to discuss program X but do everything to discuss and meet with personnel who work with program Y.
Last minute and unannounced persons added to the visiting party.
“Wandering” visitors, who act offended when confronted.
Using alternate mechanisms. For example, if a classified visit request is not approved, the foreign entity may attempt a commercial visit.
Visitors ask questions outside the scope of the approved visit, hoping to get a courteous or spontaneous response.
Suspicious work offers
Foreign scientists and engineers will offer their services to research facilities, academic institutions, and defence contractors. This may be an MO to place a foreign national inside the facility to collect information on a desired technology.
Indicators
Foreign applicant has a scientific background in a specialty for which his country has been identified as having a collection requirement.
Foreign applicant offers services for free. Foreign government or corporation associated with government is paying expenses.
Foreign interns (students working on Masters or Doctorate degrees) offer to work under a knowledgeable individual for free, usually for a period of two to three years.
The information on the technology the foreign individual wants to research is proprietary, classified, or export-controlled.
Targeting at international exhibits, seminars, and conventions
International exhibits, seminars and conventions offer opportunities to link programs and technologies with knowledgeable personnel but such events can also present some security risks.
Indicators
Topics at seminars and conventions deal with classified or controlled technologies and/or applications.
The country or organization sponsoring the seminar or conference has tried unsuccessfully to visit the facility.
Invitation to brief or lecture in a foreign country with all expenses paid.
Requests for presentation summary 6-12 months prior to seminar.
Photography and filming appear suspicious.
Attendees wear false or incomplete name tags.
Exploitation of joint ventures and joint research
Co-production and various exchange agreements potentially offer significant collection opportunities for foreign interests to target restricted or proprietary technology.
Indicators
Foreign representative wants to access the local area network (LAN).
Foreign representative wants unrestricted access to the facility.
Enticing Canadian contractors to provide large amounts of technical data as part of the bidding process, only to have the contract cancelled.
Potential technology-sharing agreements during the joint venture are one-sided.
The foreign organization sends more foreign representatives than are necessary for the project.
The foreign representatives single out company personnel to elicit information outside the scope of the project.
Acquisitions of technology and companies
Foreign entities attempt to gain access to sensitive technologies by purchasing Canadian companies and technologies.
Indicators
New employees hired from the foreign partner’s company, or its foreign partners, wish to immediately access sensitive corporate or proprietary information.
Co-opting of former employees
Former employees who had access to sensitive, proprietary, or classified program information remain a potential counter-intelligence concern. Targeting cultural commonalities to establish rapport is often associated with the collection attempt. Former employees may be viewed as excellent prospects for collection operations and considered less likely to feel obligated to comply with Canadian export controls or company security requirements.
Indicators
Former employee took a job with a foreign company working on the same technology.
Former employee maintains contact with former company and employees.
Employee alternates working with Canadian companies and foreign companies every few years.
Targeting cultural commonalities
Foreign entities exploit the cultural background of company personnel in order to elicit information.
Indicators
Employees receive unsolicited greetings or other correspondence from embassy of country of origin.
Employees receive invitations to visit country of family origin for the purpose of providing lecture or receiving an award.
Company personnel are singled out by foreign visitors of same cultural background to socialize.
https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/prrts/spng/mthds-eng.asp